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“You’re either with us, or you are with the terrorists” - 
Juxtaposed Ideologies in the War on Terror 
 
Maryam Jameela 
University of Sheffield 
 
A recent British government policy document has attempted to tackle the various guises of 
extremism by outlining definitions and proposed solutions for a structural approach to the threat 
of terror. In doing so, the command paper characterises the relationship between Britain and 
Islamic terrorists as one of an ideological conflict playing out between Western powers and Muslim 
fundamentalists.  In exaggerating the apparent polarisation necessary for an ideological conflict, I 
will demonstrate how the text locks us into certain narratives that filter out historical contexts in 
favour of a binary rhetoric aimed at furthering conflicts based on ideology as natural conclusions, 
rather than the constructions and manipulations of policy. 
 
9/11 has come to signify the starting point in a fifteen year conflict, with the so-called “war on 
terror” carrying extensive consequences for much of the world. It is difficult to communicate the weight 
and cultural nuance of the various wars, invasions, and attacks and their political and legal 
ramifications, that characterise this period of suspicion and paranoia against Muslim communities. 
Much of the political discourse emerging from Western nations has depicted this “war on terror” as a 
clash of civilisations, as in Samuel Huntington’s influential work of the same name that posits a divide 
between Eastern principles and Western values (1996). Edward Said’s earlier canonical work 
Orientalism (1978) interrogates this rhetoric and presents a powerful critique of a binary opposition 
that extends into contemporary times, particularly with respect to Muslims of colour as the locus of an 
ongoing ideological conflict.  
One such manifestation of this conflict is British Prime Minister David Cameron’s spearheading 
of a counter-extremism strategy in response to his belief in the growing threat of Islamic extremism and 
his concern at British citizens potentially fighting for Islamic terrorists. Command Paper 9148 outlines 
the most recent iteration from the British government of their intention to tackle all forms of extremism 
and the threat they pose to “British values” (5).  My close reading of this particular policy document will 
illuminate the nuances of ideological terror-based conflict and will question the impact that this 
ideology of juxtaposed identities has had upon the government’s conception of British values and how 
this apparently all-encompassing value system clashes with religious freedoms, with particular 
emphasis upon Muslim communities within the United Kingdom.  
 
Policy analysis as narrative deconstruction 
Policy documents operate within a three part structure: firstly, they identify a national issue to 
be addressed; secondly, they consider actions to be taken for the public good; and finally, they outline 
actions to be taken by the government, and detail how these actions will be implemented. Such a 
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structure is more of a tradition in politics and sociology than in literature or, at the very least, a more 
explicit structure which remains only implicit in fiction and literary criticism. 
A recent debate between policy analysis researchers has seen a move from empirical approaches 
to constructivism and critical realism. Mark Bevir isolates a moment from his work with R. A. W Rhodes 
that is particularly useful for practising traditional fiction analysis with a nonfiction methodology. Bevir 
and Rhodes move away from a tradition of empiricism and outline a framework they name “meaning 
holism” (Bevir 184) as an alternative approach more attuned to social realities and the formulation of 
meaning. Bevir states that “no proposition ever confronts the world in splendid isolation. Evidence only 
ever confronts overarching webs of belief, and even then the evidence is saturated by theories that are 
part of the relevant webs of belief” (188). For Bevir, the notion of states behaving as social agents 
cognizant of belief systems and cultural narratives is a concept central to good policy analysis. However, 
the centrality of context still does not account for the process and relative veracity of how any particular 
context is deemed to be relevant for analysis. For example, this paper will read post-9/11 culture through 
the lens of a postcolonial feminism cognizant of Western colonialism and imperialism, a context 
relevant to anti-extremism legislation due to the historical status of Britain as an imperial and colonial 
power. This context is a pertinent “web of belief” that will yield an analysis critical of Western 
epistemologies, a context that provides a historical background often missing from contemporary 
analyses of Western influence on non-Western regions. As valuable as this context is for my analysis, it 
still constitutes a construction which in itself demonstrates how necessary it is to interrogate how 
knowledge is produced and to acknowledge the artificiality of deeming certain contexts to be more 
relevant than others. 
Stuart McAnulla extends these concerns by taking issue with the role agency plays in Bevir and 
Rhodes’ conception of the self-reflexive praxis of policy makers themselves. McAnulla questions the 
apparent straightforwardness of their articulation of contextualised meaning, instead arguing that there 
is a distinction between how webs of belief are “in reality” and how individuals come to perceive those 
webs. For McAnulla, it is important to assert that whilst the agency of individuals (both in policy making 
and its reception) is fluid and subject to change based on context and history, it is limited by tradition 
and by the social responsibilities placed upon individuals (116). McAnulla suggests that these 
constraints can be mitigated through the inclusion of social structures in the model in order to 
acknowledge that both entities are changed by the “impact of the external world on actors”, itself a 
recognition of the fluctuating nature of personal belief systems (123). That context cannot be assumed 
to form the entirety of a “relevant web of belief” but, rather, questions the reception and dissemination 
of policy documents. In other words, as much as the contexts and influences behind political thought 
need to be foregrounded, McAnulla demonstrates that a flexible position alive to the developing 
contexts and impact upon social change on the part of both policy makers and policy readers is also 
vital. 
However, in positing a separation between beliefs in reality and how individuals interpret that 
reality, McAnulla betrays a troubling conceptualisation at the heart of policy analysis. As Patricia Hill 
Collins states, “no one group has a clear angle of vision. No one group possesses the theory or 
methodology that allows it to discover the absolute ‘truth’” (234). In developing the relevant 
methodology or theory for policy analysis the issue is not sifting truthful reality from perceptions of 
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reality. Rather, it is a matter of acknowledging and ascertaining perceptions of culture, society and 
history and, as Bevir and Rhodes advocate, perceiving a sense of storytelling within policy analysis so 
as to better formulate a picture of the context of policy analysis, and how it is understood within 
different time periods and contexts. 
This revised model impacts government policy analysis in that it acknowledges the importance 
of specificity and nuance in understanding the centrality of storytelling or narrative to policy analysis. 
As Command Paper 9148 concerns preventative counter-terrorism measures that involve Muslim 
extremists, the context and history that I will have to be mindful of is one that many countries are 
currently experiencing. We might list the following as elements of the dominant contextual narrative in 
which this paper emerges: 9/11; 7/7; the attacks in Madrid and Paris; the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; 
US torture and illegal detainment in Abu Ghraib; and drone operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
This list is neither comprehensive nor nuanced and paints a very crude picture. It also calls to mind 
oppositions of good and evil, and cause and effect; and, given that this ideological conflict is still on-
going, it is perhaps inevitable that issues of accountability are heatedly debated. However, these binary 
oppositions are themselves constructed, and are arguably reductive attempts at over-arching narratives. 
It is, nevertheless, a context that will define how I read this policy document and will affect the 
constructions of both my aims and conclusions.  
 
Juxtaposed Ideologies 
The Counter Extremism Strategy (2015) policy document defines extremism from a 
governmental perspective and outlines relevant problems and solutions. David Cameron and Home 
Secretary, Theresa May introduce the document by mentioning the centrality of “British values”, which 
Cameron defines as “the liberty we cherish, the rights we enjoy and the democratic institutions that help 
protect them” (CM 9148, 5). May includes “democracy, free speech, mutual respect, and opportunity 
for all” in these values (CM 9148, 7). The phrase “British values” is used repeatedly throughout and 
frequently to justify the necessity of action in defence of these values. Cameron and May establish a 
binary opposition with “extremism” as “the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values” (CM 
9148, 9). The pronoun “our” cements the binary and defines the conflict as one that is ‘us’ against ‘them’. 
This notion is further underscored by the infrequent, yet powerful, assertion that British society is 
“successful” (CM 9148, 5) because it is a “diverse, multi-racial, multi-faith society” (CM 9148, 9). In 
positioning Britain as a successful pluralistic society invested in racial and religious diversity, the 
document constructs British society as a utopia open to all, a utopia forced to defend itself from the 
scourge of extremism. Given that all of the above quotations come from “Chapter 1 - The Threat from 
Extremism” (CM 9148, 9) the implication is that those individuals characterised as “extremists” would 
therefore be anti-diversity, anti-free-speech and anti-democracy.  
The document does clarify that “our values are not exclusive to Britain...they have been shaped 
by our history...in which we have seen injustice, misery and damage caused by discrimination on the 
basis of religion, race, gender, disability or sexual orientation” (CM 9148). The use of the passive “we 
have seen” communicates the sense that any past injustices, whilst they shaped British values, were not 
perpetrated by Britain. In a parallel with the government’s version of contemporary reality, this 
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particular narrative strand cements Britain’s position as passive victim of various injustices (and 
implicitly a perpetrator of none) and the upholder of values.  
The construction of British values holding fast against extremism can be further elucidated by 
another favoured pattern in the text ― the description of certain Muslim teachings as “ideology” (CM 
9148, 10). When discussing “the harm extremism causes”, the text states that “across the country there 
is evidence of extremists, driven by ideology, promoting or justifying actions which run directly contrary 
to our shared values” (CM 9148, 10). In this case “ideology” is a rather vague choice of words, implying 
a cohesive, overarching system whereby extremists are able to function and navigate against the equally 
vague, yet implausibly cohesive, British values. The phrase is used again with the assertion that “there 
is a clear distinction between Islam — a religion followed peacefully by millions — and the ideology 
promoted by Islamist extremists” (CM 9148, 21). This rhetoric creates an opposition, between “values” 
and “ideology”. “Values” is communicated around phrases like “shared” and “community”, implying 
togetherness and benefits for all, while “ideology” is altogether more sinister, implying dogmatism and 
a concerted effort to defeat these less threatening “values”, the latter a more benign word that is left to 
imply an “extremist” Muslim. This implication is further heightened by a distinction between “religion” 
as acceptable and “ideology” as a mutation of the former, which paints a narrative of harmless Muslim 
subjects and harmful Muslim subjects. The harmful Muslim has, then, been established in opposition 
to foundational British values and is thus marginalised within the text to occupy a linguistically and 
analytically menacing position. 
The policy document presents the need for action as one rooted in defending fundamental 
values threatened by concerted effort from outside Others to destabilise the nation. Given this stark 
binary opposition it is little wonder that arguments like Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations (1996) are 
so widespread and popular. When presented as the only option of analysis the conflict of terrorism 
comes to be viewed as a wildly oversimplified clash of juxtaposed ideologies, where, at least in this policy 
document, the narrative constitutes an accurate description of reality. The history and context of Britain 
as a possible perpetrator of state-sanctioned terrorism (for example, its involvement in illegal 
detainment and torture practices1), or even the history of Britain as a colonial and imperial nation that 
brought harm to millions, is not a narrative strand conducive to the picture being painted by the policy 
document of Britain under attack. Evidently, the narrative framing within the policy document of 
British values being defended against extremist ideologies exacerbates an already symbolically and 
physically violent conflict. 
 
Modes of Extremism 
The accusation of extremism is not, however, only levelled at Muslims. Cameron claims that 
the “scourge of extremism” is constituted by “sickening displays of neo-Nazism, Islamophobia, 
antisemitism and, of course, Islamist extremism” (CM 9148, 5). This tendency to group disparate forms 
of extremism together, is further demonstrated with the following assertion: “Islamist extremism is not 
the only threat, as seen by the vicious actions of a number of extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups” 
                                                          
1 The Iraq Historic Allegations Team, which tackles allegations of unlawful killing and torture during 
the Iraq war has been “overwhelmed with cases,” reports Jonathan Owen in The Independent (1 Feb. 
2016).  
FORUM | ISSUE 22 Maryam Jameela 6 
 
 
(CM 9148, 10). This is followed by various examples of racist, Islamophobic, Islamic extremist or anti-
Semitic hate crimes all described as acts of “intolerance” and “extremism” (CM 9148, 11). The decision 
to group separate facets of extremism together is a peculiar one given that much of the document is at 
pains to chart the growth of Islamic “ideology” at length. It is an epistemologically questionable decision 
to place Islamic extremism and racist, Islamophobic hate crimes on the same plane, to say nothing of 
the decision to include neo-Nazism and antisemitism in an already confused grouping. There is no 
explanation of any possible links between the presentation of Islamic extremism in the media and the 
rise of Islamophobic hate crimes, nor any justification of grouping disparate forms of hate crime 
together, other than for convenience or for its own ideological purposes.  
Whilst there is an explanation of the development of extreme right-wing groups in the UK (CM 
9148, 23) with a discussion of contesting online spaces where said groups mobilise, chapters four, five 
and six are all concerned with laying out methods for counter-terrorism. The context and history behind 
terms such as “extremism,” “terrorism” and “radicalisation” have been developed into connoting 
overwhelmingly Muslim subjects2  indeed, I would argue that in contemporary times the terms 
“terrorist” and “extremist” have become synonymous with “Muslim.” Absent articulations are thus 
particularly telling for the narrative construction at work here. In a linguistic sense, at least, Muslims 
are both the text and implicit text of the policy document — however committed the government is to 
combating hate crimes. Whilst it is arguable that this concerted attention to other groups is a misguided 
attempt to avoid accusations of singling out Muslims, it remains the case that the policy document 
focuses overwhelmingly on Muslims. 
As a policy document, it is certainly arguable that the text is not positioned to offer up any such 
explanation, but as Bevir and Rhodes would argue, such an imposition could only serve to allow policy 
analysts to reflect on the particular choices of policy makers. In this instance, the grouping of different 
modes of extremism conveys a lack of rigour in tackling antisemitism and Islamophobia, especially 
given that so little space is given to identifying causes, symptoms and possible solutions. The priority is 
evidently Islamic extremism, with a sizeable but still much smaller amount of attention paid to right-
wing groups. This places the issues to be tackled within British society in an unfortunate hierarchy, to 
say nothing of the counter-narrative it presents to the notion of a “successful” Britain (CM 9148, p. 5). 
Whilst acknowledging that there are more forms of extremism than Islamic terrorism, the document is 
unsuccessful in constructing nuanced accounts of these other forms, thus undermining their legitimacy 
as conflicts which require attention. 
 
National identity/religious identity 
The question of religious identity clashing with national identity is addressed in Cameron’s 
foreword when he states that “people should have no difficulty in identifying themselves as a proud 
Sikh, or Jew, or Muslim, Hindu or Christian as well as being a proud Brit”, (CM 9148, 5) whilst going 
on to state his aim of stopping “them [extremists] from driving a wedge between British Muslims and 
the rest of our society” (CM 9148, 6). As discussed earlier, this contradicts the conceit of including other 
                                                          
2 A recent article by Omar Alnatour in The Huffington Post presents a convincing case by analysing the 
statistics behind terrorism in the US and Europe, particularly with regards to the link between the 
ethnicity of the criminal and the style of media coverage (12 Sep. 2015).  
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forms of extremism alongside Islamic terrorism and also demarcates “British Muslims” as a group 
separate from ‘regular’ British people. Granted, Cameron’s words imply unity but the subtle separation 
of “Muslim” and “British Muslim” is one which marks the latter group out as separate and Other. 
The government’s intention for the paper is to: 
“promote a positive alternative showing that it is entirely possible to reconcile your faith 
identity and national identity, something that the overwhelming majority of people of 
all faiths do every day.” (CM 9148, 24) 
In doing so, it extends the clash between national identity and religious identity as one fundamental to 
solving the ideological conflict and further integrating British Muslims into British society — itself a 
claim that rests on the assumption that British Muslims are somehow not fully integrated.  
This is not to say that this particular conflict is one which British Muslims do actually confront 
on a regular basis, but rather that it has been assumed that being Muslim must clash with any sense of 
Britishness. It is reasonable to assume that many British Muslims do not experience this clash in any 
way and, whilst there is a need to discuss this at length elsewhere, in this particular policy document 
the language used to address conflicts of nationality and religion subtly highlights a separation of British 
and Muslim, as with the demarcation between ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims.’ Muslims are debated 
and dissected in the public arena in terms of possible allegiances and internal conflicts, all the while 
characterised as subtly distinct from other British people. This particular example of the perception of 
British Muslims is an example of a more symbolic conflict that frames Muslims as carrying internal 
conflicts and in opposition to a “normal” British community. 
 
Construction of terrorism 
The construction of this Muslim subject is further exemplified by the repeated opposition of a 
marginalised voice gaining a mainstream reception. The text states that “a small number of strident 
extremists drown out the mainstream majority, both in person and online” and concludes “we’re now 
going to actively encourage the reforming and moderate Muslim voices” (CM 9148, 31). Once again, 
such rhetoric embeds the dichotomy of a helpless Muslim, who is therefore open to cooperation, versus 
a harmful Muslim, who is thus closed to the values of Britain and actively looking to attack those values. 
The relationship between isolated and marginalised voices gaining traction appears to involve a degree 
of cognitive dissonance, but the implication is clearly that the internet acts as a great leveller, a platform 
bringing social reach to a small group. 
This opposition serves to support the government’s proposed solution of recruiting the voices 
of “individuals and groups who have credibility and experience fighting extremism within their 
communities” (CM 9148, 31). This leaves no room for “moderate” Muslims who are not extremists but 
are still critical of government policy towards Muslims. The proposed solutions of the text are based on 
the principle that “government cannot do this alone” (CM 9148, 16) and encourages individuals to 
confront extremists online, in addition to calling for internet companies to restrict and censor platforms 
for extremism. As demonstrated earlier, the definitions of extremism and terrorism are under the 
purview of the government, along with the “credibility” (CM 9148, 31) of individuals who may confront 
online extremism. The dichotomy constructed around the role of British Muslims, then, is one which is 
centred not so much on the fact that “government cannot do this alone,” but rather on the notorious 
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proviso that  “you’re either with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush 30/57). This positioning 
constitutes a stifling dichotomy that capitalises on a narrative of juxtaposition which in turn isolates 
“moderate’” Muslims further away from that which the government deems acceptable. 
The narrative of Islamic extremists as a small minority is one that presumes all Muslims have 
the potential for extremism, especially given the reference to ‘Prevent’, an initiative encouraging 
schoolteachers to identify early signs of radicalisation in children (CM 9148, 26). Explicitly, the text 
claims that moderate Muslims are acceptable Muslims that can integrate seamlessly into British culture, 
but implicitly the text communicates a profound mistrust of Islam. For example, the text constructs an 
image of terrorist figures able to weaken the “social fabric of our country” because they hail from places 
where “women’s rights are fundamentally eroded” and where “there is discrimination on the basis of 
gender, race, religious belief or sexual orientation” (CM 9148, 10). Not only does this erase the existence 
of native British Muslims, this rhetoric also functions as justification for state-sanctioned violence, 
especially given that the document recommends a number of strategies which inform the UK 
government’s decision to bomb Syria.3 The construction of terrorists, and implicitly Muslim terrorists, 
follows a pattern both familiar from both other government policies and the British media which portray 
Muslims as inherently malevolent and worthy of suspicion. The link between the representation of 
Muslims and state-sanctioned violence against Muslims needs only the context of the past 15 or so years 




The reductive and decontextualized approach to defining both Islam and Islamic extremism is 
best typified with regards to the Muslim British women4 mentioned in the text. The only instance of 
singling out a specific sub-group arises when Muslim women are mentioned. When discussing the 
impact of ignoring both Islamic extremism and other forms of hate crime, Theresa May writes that the 
end result would be the erosion of “women’s rights” (CM 9148, 7). By drawing this conclusion, May 
establishes a tentative link between unopposed Islamic extremism and the loss of rights for women. 
This is repeated later with the same phrasing. Such a suggestion contributes to a pernicious and 
widespread narrative of backwards, brown men subjugating brown women. As Gayatri Spivak outlines 
in her 1983 essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” this stereotype enables a situation where “white men are 
saving brown women from brown men” (93). Brown men are further demonised in order to elevate the 
status of white saviours, thereby leaving brown women stranded in the middle as objects of oppression. 
The text communicates this context through the manner in which it introduces Muslim women. 
For example, a chapter headed “The Extremist Threat” posits that extremists “reject the very principle 
upon which democracy is based” (CM 9148, 7). This claim precedes a section under the heading of 
                                                          
3 The BBC News website provides a useful breakdown of the lead-up to the UK government’s decision 
to engage in air strikes against Islamic State in Syria: “Syria air strikes: − What you need to know.”  
4 I have presumed the terrorist subjects cited thus far are gendered as male because an overwhelming 
majority of Islamic extremists are shown in the news media to be male. The media declares female 
Muslim terrorists to be particularly noteworthy. For example, The New York Times published an article 
by Jane Huckerby with the headline “When Women Become Terrorists,” discussing the strategic choice 
of extremists to deploy female terrorists in a male-dominated sphere. 
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“harmful and illegal cultural practices” (CM 9148, 13) where female genital mutilation, forced marriage 
and honour-based violence are discussed. Public discourse on these three issues has historically aligned 
them as issues rife in Muslim communities and it is no coincidence that the section ends with the line, 
“we must tackle the root causes that mean certain communities continue to propagate such harmful 
practices” (CM 9148, 13, my italics). Rather than explicitly addressing the harmful stereotype of these 
conditions as exclusive or widespread within Muslim communities, the text chooses to implicitly align 
the two, rather than exploring the existence of these highly complex and constantly evolving issues in 
the social context within which they originate. Once again, the text constructs a narrative of oppositions 
that posits the superiority of Western culture against a subordinate and backwards Other, the Muslim 
subject. 
Whilst concluding with a desire for a cohesive community, the text claims that isolation is a 
major root cause of radicalisation and that such isolation breeds “values” which can take hold and 
promote  
“behaviour which is deeply discriminatory to women and girls, such as limiting equal access to 
education, justice, and employment, thereby creating an environment where a range of illegal 
cultural practices including so-called Honour-Based Violence, FGM [female genital mutilation] 
and Forced Marriage are perpetuated.” (CM 9148, 37) 
The attitude conveyed within the text, then, is one which positions the historical and social 
background of Muslim culture as one which is inherently opposed to rights for women, and, if allowed 
to spiral from a belief into an ideology, will bring its misogyny to Western cultures.  
Jasbir Puar’s model of US exceptionalism builds on Spivak’s articulation of the position of 
brown women in relation to larger systems of political policy and rhetoric. Puar describes “US sexual 
exceptionalism” (2) as a strategy that consolidates the nation’s self-ordained position as a liberated and 
liberating global power. Puar uses the optics of queer theory to elaborate upon America’s use of the 
appearance of liberalism to advance the rhetoric of a civilised and liberated West against a sexually-
repressed and oppressive Muslim world in the East (39). Puar’s model was applied to sexual torture at 
Abu Ghraib and media coverage of the events, and it also provides an interesting context to this policy 
document’s framing of British values under attack from a Muslim threat. This particular document, and 
indeed British foreign policy more generally, has demonstrated a proclivity for constructing an 
opposition of explicitly progressive, even utopic, British values against an implicitly regressive and 
overtly oppressive culture of Islam in the East. As Puar argued in her work, Western formations of 
identity and self-knowledge are predicated on the construction, and often the denigration, of the Other 
(41). It is politically, socially and culturally easier to engender a narrative based on conflicting ideology, 
rather than confronting alternative, more nuanced, historical narratives.  
It is not a notable innovation that Muslim women are paid particular attention. Indeed, women 
are frequently positioned as a litmus test for a successful society and have come to symbolise a conflict 
that often uses the image of Muslim women in various veils as synonymous with oppression. Ultimately, 
the policy document reveals an uninterrogated conviction of British superiority which revels in the 
superiority of Britain as a haven of equal rights for women in direct opposition to the apparent 
barbarism of Islamic culture, or, as the text would name it, Islamic ideology. The text utilises a 
foundation of historical oppositions based on ‘clashes of culture’ in order to engineer a further 
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ideological conflict where mounting a defence (and, indeed, definition) of “our” values is only 
conceivable within the arena of ideological conflict. Women, then, become puppets of discourse that are 
used to signify the space between warring ideologies, both as individuals and as a group. 
 
Conclusion 
Command Paper 9148 carefully constructs a narrative of opposition between Britain as a victim 
of terrorism defending values such as freedom, democracy and mutual respect, against the cohesive, 
organised and brute force of Islamic extremism. The question of British people who are also Muslims 
has become, for British citizens, a symbol of this apparent culture clash; the policy document is at pains 
to assert the acceptability of ‘harmless’ Muslims who adhere to British values without questioning 
possible Islamophobia from the government. Muslim women feature prominently throughout, and 
whilst the government may emphasise the importance of tackling discrimination against Muslim 
women from Muslim ‘cultures,’ it nevertheless remains the case that this strategy exists to draw 
attention away from a culture of sexism in Britain and towards the supposed sexism and misogyny 
within Muslim patriarchal culture. These tactics serve to present a clash of civilisations, and exaggerate 
the polarisation necessary for an ideological conflict, while disavowing the ideological nature of British 
culture in order to maintain a presentation of Britain as a dehistoricised victim of terror. 
David Cameron recently exposed his belief that Muslim women are “traditionally submissive”, 
(Harker) and drew a link between British Muslim women being unable to speak English, and their 
inability to deter husbands and sons from terrorism (Press Association). Cameron’s comments typify 
the worst stereotypes about Muslim women, of an innately submissive group of people who do not 
integrate and do not engage with local communities or British values. These stereotypes serve to 
dehumanise and belittle British Muslim women whilst using them as props for a wider debate on 
terrorism - irrespective of accuracy, empathy or good cognitive practices. I have demonstrated how such 
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